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MALICIOUS EXPERTS VERSUS THE MULTIPLICATIVE WEIGHTS
ALGORITHM IN ONLINE PREDICTION
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR, H. VINCENT POOR, AND XIN ZHANG
Abstract. We consider a prediction problem with two experts and a forecaster. We assume that
one of the experts is honest and makes correct prediction with probability µ at each round. The
other one is malicious, who knows true outcomes at each round and makes predictions in order
to maximize the loss of the forecaster. Assuming the forecaster adopts the classical multiplicative
weights algorithm, we find an upper bound (3.12) for the value function of the malicious expert,
and also a lower bound (4.1). Our results imply that the multiplicative weights algorithm cannot
resist the corruption of malicious experts. We also show that an adaptive multiplicative weights
algorithm is asymptotically optimal for the forecaster, and hence more resistant to the corruption
of malicious experts.
1. Introduction
Prediction with expert advice is classical and fundamental in the field of online learning, and we
refer the reader to [6] for a nice survey. In this problem, a forecaster makes predictions based on
advices of experts so as to minimize his loss, i.e., the cumulative difference between his predictions
and true outcomes. A standard performance criterion is the regret: the difference between the loss
of the forecaster and the minimum among losses of all experts. The prediction problem is often
studied in the so-called adversarial setting and the stochastic setting. In the adversarial setting,
the advice of experts is chosen by an adversary so as to maximize the regret of the forecaster, and
therefore the problem can be viewed as a zero-sum game between the forecaster and the adversary
(see e.g. [12] [9] [8] [5] [4]). In the stochastic setting, the losses of each expert are drawn independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time from a fixed but unknown distribution, and smaller
regrets can be achieved compared with the adversarial setting (see e.g. [7] [10] [13]).
In this paper, we consider the model in [14] which considers a mix of adversarial and stochastic
settings. It is a learning system with two experts and a forecaster. One of the experts is honest,
who at each round makes a correct prediction with probability µ. The other one is malicious,
who knows the true outcome at each round and makes his predictions so as to maximize the loss
of the forecaster. Here we assume that the forecaster adopts the classical multiplicative weights
algorithm, and study its resistance to the corruption of the malicious expert. Denote by V α(N, ρ)
the expected cumulative loss for the forecaster, where α is the strategy chosen by the malicious
expert, N is the fixed time horizon, and ρ is the initial weight of the malicious expert. Instead of
regret, we analyze the asymptotic maximal loss lim
N→∞
max
α
V α(N,1/2)
N .
It was proved in [14] that if the malicious expert is only allowed to adopt offline policies, i.e., to
decide whether to tell the true outcome at each round at the beginning of the game, then we have
lim
N→∞
max
α
V α(N,1/2)
N = 1 − µ. It implies that the extra power of the malicious expert cannot incur
extra losses to the forecaster.
Here we allow the malicious expert to adopt online policies, i.e., at each round, the malicious
expert chooses whether to tell the truth based on all the prior histories. To find an upper bound on
asymptotic losses, we rescale dynamic programming equations of the problem and obtain a partial
differential equation (PDE). Then we prove that the unique solution of this PDE provides us an
1
2upper bound
lim sup
N→∞
max
α
V α(N, 1/2)
N
≤ 1− µ2.
For the lower bound, we design a simple strategy for the malicious expert and prove that
lim inf
N→∞
max
α
V α(N, 1/2)
N
> 1− µ,
which implies that the malicious expert can incur extra losses to the forecaster when online poli-
cies are admissible. To make the forecaster more resistant to the malicious expert, we consider
an adaptive multiplicative weights algorithm and prove that it is asymptotically optimal for the
forecaster.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we mathematically formulate this
problem and develop its dynamic programming equations. In Section 3, we show the upper bound
of asymptotic losses, and in Section 4 we find the lower bound. In Section 5, we consider the
malicious expert versus the adaptive multiplicative weights algorithm. In Section 6, we summarize
our results and their implications.
2. Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce the mathematical model as in [14]. Consider a learning system with
two experts and a forecaster. For each round t ∈ N+, denote the prediction of expert i ∈ {1, 2} by
xit ∈ {0, 1}, and the true outcome by yt ∈ {0, 1}.
Suppose that the forecaster adopts the multiplicative weights algorithm. For each round t ∈ N+,
denote by pit the weight of expert i ∈ {1, 2}, p
1
t + p
2
t = 1. Then the prediction of the forecaster is
yˆt :=
2∑
i=1
pitx
i
t.
Given ǫ ∈ (0, 1), the weights evolve as follows
pit+1 =
pitǫ
|xit−yt|
p1t ǫ
|x1t−yt| + p2t ǫ
|x2t−yt|
, i = 1, 2.
Denote the entire history up to round t− 1 by
Gt := {p
1
l , p
2
l , x
1
l , x
2
l , yl : l = 1, . . . t− 1} ∪ {p
1
t , p
2
t }.
Assume expert 2 is honest, and at each round t ∈ N+ make correct predictions with probability
µ ∈ (0, 1) independently of Gt, i.e.,
x2t =
{
yt with probability µ,
1− yt with probability 1− µ.
Expert 1 is malicious and knows the accuracy µ of expert 2 and the outcome yt at each round. At
each stage t ∈ N+, based on the information Gt, the malicious expert can choose to lie, i.e., make
x1t = 1− yt, or to tell the truth, i.e., make x
1
t = yt. Denote by At the space of functions from Gt to
{T,L}, where T (truth) and L (lie) represent x1t = yt and x
1
t = 1− yt respectively.
At each round t ∈ N+, the loss of the forecaster is l(yˆt, yt) := |yˆt − yt|, which is also the gain of
the malicious expert. It can be easily verified that
(2.1) l(yˆt, yt) =


p1t if αt = L, x
2
t = yt,
1 if αt = L, x
2
t = 1− yt,
0 if αt = T, x
2
t = yt,
1− p1t if αt = T, x
2
t = 1− yt.
3And the evolution of p1t is as follows:
(2.2) p1t+1 =


g(p1t ) if αt = L, x
2
t = yt,
g(−1)(p1t ) if αt = T, x
2
t = 1− yt,
p1t otherwise,
where
g(p1t ) =
1
1 + (1/p1t − 1)/ǫ
, g(−1)(p1t ) =
1
1 + (1/p1t − 1)ǫ
.
For a fixed time horizon N , the goal of the malicious expert is to maximize the cumulative loss
of the forecaster by choosing a sequence of strategies α = {(α1, α2, . . . ) : αt ∈ At, t ∈ N+}, i.e.,
solving the optimization problem
V (N, ρ) := max
α
E
α
[
N∑
t=1
l(yˆt, yt)
∣∣ p11 = ρ
]
.
According to (2.1), we obtain the expected current loss
(2.3) Eαt [l(yˆt, yt)|Gt] =
{
(1− µ+ µp1t ) if αt = L,
(1− µ)(1− p1t ) if αt = T.
In combination with (2.2), we get dynamic programming equations
V (t+ 1, ρ) =max{(1− µ+ µρ) + µV (t, g(ρ)) + (1− µ)V (t, ρ),(2.4)
(1− µ)(1− ρ) + (1− µ)V
(
t, g(−1)(ρ)
)
+ µV (t, ρ)},
together with initial conditions V (0, ρ) = 0.
3. Upper bound on the Value function
In this section, we properly rescale the (2.4) and obtain a PDE (HJB). We explicitly solve this
equation, and show that its solution (3.5) provides an upper bound on lim sup
N→∞
V (N,1/2)
N .
3.1. Limiting PDE. To appropriately rescale (2.4) and follow the formulation of [2], we change
the variable
x =
ln(1/ρ − 1)
ln(1/ǫ)
, ρ =
1
1 + (1/ǫ)x
,
and define
V˜ (t, x) := −V
(
t,
1
1 + (1/ǫ)x
)
.
Then (2.4) becomes
V˜ (t+ 1, x) =min
{
−
(
1− µ+
µ
1 + (1/ǫ)x
)
+ µV˜ (t, x+ 1) + (1− µ)V˜ (t, x),(3.1)
−(1− µ)
(
1−
1
1 + (1/ǫ)x
)
+ (1− µ)V˜ (t, x− 1) + µV˜ (t, x)
}
.
Define scaled value functions via the equation V˜
δ(δt,δx)
δ = V˜ (t, x). Substituting in (3.1), we obtain
that
V˜ δ(t+ δ, x) =min
{
−δ
(
1− µ+
µ
1 + (1/ǫ)x/δ
)
+ µV˜ δ(t, x+ δ) + (1− µ)V˜ δ(t, x)(3.2)
−δ(1− µ)
(
1−
1
1 + (1/ǫ)x/δ
)
+ (1− µ)V˜ δ (t, x− δ)) + µV˜ δ(t, x)
}
.
4Taking δ to 0 in (3.2), we obtain a first order PDE
0 = vt(t, x)+max {1− µ+ µs(x)− µvx(t, x),(3.3)
(1− µ)(1− s(x)) + (1− µ)vx(t, x)} ,
where v(0, x) = 0, and
s(x) =
{
0, if x > 0,
1, if x < 0.
Define Ω1 = {x > 0},Ω2 = {x < 0},H = {x = 0}, and Hamiltonians
H1(x, p) = max{1 − µ− µp, 1− µ+ (1− µ)p}, x ∈ Ω¯1,
H2(x, p) = max{1 − µp, (1− µ)p}, x ∈ Ω¯2.
Then (3.3) becomes
vt +Hi(x, vx) = 0 for x ∈ Ωi, i = 1, 2.(3.4)
Following Ishii’s definition of viscosity solutions to discontinuous Hamiltonians, we complement
(3.4) by
min{vt +H1(x, vx), vt +H2(x, vx)} ≤ 0 for x ∈ H,
max{vt +H1(x, vx), vt +H2(x, vx)} ≥ 0 for x ∈ H,
where min and max should be understood in the sense of viscosity solutions.
Solving (3.4) by the method of characteristics and assuming that the value function is differen-
tiable with respect to x on H, we conjecture the solution
v(t, x) =


−(1− µ)t, if x ∈ [(1− µ)t,∞),
−(1− µ2)t+ µx if x ∈ [−µt, (1− µ)t],
−t, if x ∈ (−∞,−µt].
(3.5)
Proposition 3.1. A viscosity solution of

vt +Hi(x, vx) = 0, for x ∈ Ωi, i = 1, 2,
min{vt +H1(x, vx), vt +H2(x, vx)} ≤ 0 for x ∈ H,
max{vt +H1(x, vx), vt +H2(x, vx)} ≥ 0 for x ∈ H,
v(0, x) = 0.
(HJB)
is given by (3.5).
Proof. The initial condition v(0, x) = 0 is trivially satisfied. We show that v is a subsolution.
Suppose φ : [0,∞) × R → R is differentiable, and v − φ achieves a local maximum 0 at (t0, x0) ∈
(0,∞)×R. Since v is differentiable in the domain O := {(t, x) : t > 0, x 6= (1− µ)t, x 6= −µt}, we
have φt(t0, x0) = vt(t0, x0), φx(t0, x0) = vx(t0, x0) if (t0, x0) ∈ O. Then it is can be easily verified
that φt +Hi(x, φx) = 0 at (t0, x0), where i = 1 if x0 ≥ 0, and i = 2 if x0 ≤ 0.
Suppose (t0, x0) is on the line {(t, x) : t > 0, x = (1− µ)t}. Note that
∂−t v(t0, x0) = −(1− µ), ∂
+
t (t0, x0) = −(1− µ
2),
∂−x v(t0, x0) = µ, ∂
+
x v(t0, x0) = 0.
Since (t0, x0) is a local maximum of u− φ, we must have
(φt(t0, x0), φx(t0, x0)) ∈ {(r, p) : r ∈ [−(1− µ
2),−(1− µ)], p ∈ [0, µ]}.
Take ∆x = (1− µ)∆t. As a result of
v(t0 +∆t, x0 +∆x)− φ(t0 +∆t, x0 +∆x) ≤ 0,
5we obtain that
−(1− µ)∆t− φt∆t− φx∆x+ O(∆t) ≤ 0.
Since we can choose ∆t to be either positive or negative, it can be easily deduced that
−(1− µ)− φt − (1− µ)φx = 0.
Substituting into H1, we obtain that
φt(t0, x0) +H1(x0, φx(t0, x0)) = φt(t0, x0) + (1− µ) + (1− µ)φx(t0, x0) = 0.
If (t0, x0) is on the line {(t, x) : t > 0, x = −µt}, we have sub/super differentials of v,
∂−t v(t0, x0) = −1, ∂
+
t (t0, x0) = −(1− µ
2),
∂−x v(t0, x0) = 0, ∂
+
x v(t0, x0) = µ.
Therefore v−φ cannot achieve a local maximal on the line {(t, x) : t > 0, x = −µt}. Hence we have
proved that v is a subsolution of (HJB), and similarly, we can show that v is a supersolution. 
3.2. Control problem. In this subsection, we show that there is a unique viscosity solution of
(HJB) by applying results from [1] and [2]. First, we interpret (HJB) as a control problem.
In the domain Ωi, i = 1, 2, we take Ai = [0, 1] as the space of controls, and
bi(x, αi) = αiµ− (1− αi)(1 − µ), αi ∈ Ai,
as the controlled dynamics. For x ∈ H, define the space of controls A := A1 ×A2 × [0, 1], and the
dynamics
bH(x, (α1, α2, c)) := cb1(x, α1) + (1− c)b2(x, α2), (α1, α2, c) ∈ A.
The running cost in the domain Ω1 is given by l1(x, α1) = −(1−µ), in the domain Ω2 by l2(x, α2) =
−α2, and in H by
lH(x, (α1, α2, c)) = cl1(x, α1) + (1− c)l2(x, α2),
where (α1, α2, c) ∈ A.
In order to let trajectories stay on the boundary H for a while, for x ∈ H, we denote
A0(x) := {a = (α1, α2, c) ∈ A : bH(x, (α1, α2, c)) = 0}.
We say a control a ∈ A0(x) is regular if b1(x, α1) ≤ 0, b2(x, α2) ≥ 0, and denote
Areg0 (x) := {a = (α1, α2, c) ∈ A0(x) : (−1)
ibi(x, αi) ≥ 0}.
Define A := L∞([0, 1];A). We say a Lipschitz function Xx : [0, 1]→ R,Xx(0) = x, an admissible
trajectory if there exists some control process a(·) ∈ A, such that for a.e. t ∈ [0, 1]
X˙x(t) =b1(Xx(t), α1(t))1{Xx(t)∈Ω1} + b2(Xx(t), α2(t))1{Xx(t)∈Ω2}(3.6)
+ bH(Xx(t), (α1(t), α2(t), c(t))1{Xx(t)∈H}.
According to [2, Theorem 2.1], we have a(t) ∈ A0(Xx(t)) for a.e. t ∈ {s : Xx(s) ∈ H}. Denote by
Tx the set of admissible controlled trajectories starting from x, i.e.,
Tx := {(Xx(.), a(.)) ∈ Lip([0, 1];R) ×A such that (3.6) is satisfied and Xx(0) = x}.
Let us also introduce the set of regular trajectories,
T regx := {(Xx(.), a(.)) ∈ Tx : a(t) ∈ A
reg
0 (Xx(t)) for a.e. t ∈ {s : Xx(s) ∈ H}}
For each x ∈ R, t ∈ [0, 1), we define two value functions
V −(x, t) := inf
(Xx(.),a(.))∈Tx
∫ t
0
l(Xx(s), a(s) ds,(3.7)
V +(x, t) := inf
(Xx(.),a(.))∈T
reg
x
∫ t
0
l(Xx(s), a(s) ds,(3.8)
6where the cost function l is given by
l(Xx(s), a(s)) :=
∑
i=1,2
li(Xx(s), αi(s))1{Xx(s)∈Ωi} + lH(Xx(s), a(s))1{Xx(s)∈H}.
Note that in Ωi, i = 1, 2, the associated Hamiltonian of (3.7) and (3.8)
(x, p) 7→ sup
αi∈Ai
{−bi(x, αi)p− li(x, αi)}
coincides with Hi in the last subsection. Then according to [2, Theorem 3.3], both V
− and V +
are viscosity solutions of (HJB). We will show that they are actually equal and there is only one
viscosity solution of (HJB).
Proposition 3.2. V − = V + is the unique viscosity solution of (HJB), and V − is the minimal
supersolution of (HJB).
Proof. The argument is an application of results from [2]. Define the Hamiltonians on H via
HT (x) := sup
A0(x)
{−lH(x, a)},
HregT (x) := sup
Areg
0
(x)
{−lH(x, a)},
Let us compute HT (x). Suppose a = (α1, α2, c) ∈ A0(x). Then it can be easily verified that
maximizing −lH(x, a) over A0(x) is equivalent to maximizing
c(1− µ) + (1− c)α2,(3.9)
subject to constraints,
c(α1 + µ− 1) + (1− c)(α2 + µ− 1) = 0,(3.10)
c, α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1].
We first fix α2 and suppose α2 > (1− µ). Due to the equality
c(1− µ) + (1− c)α2 = (1− µ− α2)c+ α2,
and the fact that the coefficient before c is negative, maximizing (3.9) is equivalent to minimizing
c under the constraints. It can be easily seen that the minimum c can be obtained if and only
if α1 = 0. Therefore the equation (3.10) becomes 1 + α2c = α2 + µ, and hence (3.9) is equal to
(1 + c)(1 − µ). Now fix α1 = 0. In order to obtain the maximum of c, we have to take α2 = 1. In
that case α1 = 0, α2 = 1, c = µ and c(1− µ) + (1− c)α2 = 1− µ
2.
If α2 ≤ (1 − µ), we have c(1 − µ) + (1 − c)α2 ≤ (1 − µ) < 1 − µ
2. Since (0, 1, µ) is a regular
control, we conclude that
HT (x) = H
reg
T (x) = 1− µ
2.
We say a continuous function v is viscosity solution of
vt +H
−(x, vx) = 0 in (0, 1) ×R,(3.11) [
resp., vt +H
+(x, vx) = 0 in (0, 1) ×R
]
if it satisfies (HJB) and
vt +HT (x) = 0 on [0, 1] ×H,
[resp., vt +H
reg
T (x) = 0 on [0, 1] ×H].
According to [2, Theorem 3.3], V + is a viscosity subsolution of vt +H
+(x, vx) = 0, and hence also
a viscosity subsolution of (3.11) since HT = H
reg
T in our case. As a result of [2, Theorem 4.2, 4.4],
V − is the viscosity solution of (3.11), and the comparison result holds for (3.11). Therefore we
conclude that V + ≤ V −. Then according to their definitions (3.7) and (3.8), they must be equal.
7Finally according to [2, Theorem 4.4], V − is the minimal supersolution of (HJB) and V + is
the maximal subsolution of (HJB). Then if v is a viscosity solution of (HJB), we must have
V − ≤ v ≤ V + and hence v = V − = V +. 
3.3. Upper bound (3.12). In this subsection, we show that
v(t, x) := lim inf
(s,y,δ)→(t,x,0)
V˜ δ(s, y)
is a viscosity supersolution of (HJB). Then according to Proposition 3.2, we obtain that v(t, x) ≥
v(t, x), and hence
lim inf
N→∞
V˜ (N,Nx)
N
≥ v(1, x).
In particular, if we take x = 0, then the above inequality becomes
lim sup
N→∞
V (N, 1/2)
N
≤ 1− µ2.(3.12)
Proposition 3.3. v is a viscosity supersolution of (HJB).
Proof. The proof is almost the same as [3, Theorem 2.1], and we record here for completeness.
Fixing arbitrary T > 0, we show that v is a viscosity supersolution over [0, T ] × R. Assume
that (t0, x0) is a strict local minimum of v − φ for some φ ∈ C
∞
b ([0, T ] × R). As a result of
(3.2), it can be easily seen that v(t, x) ∈ [−t, 0]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
t0 ∈ (0, T ), v(t0, x0) = φ(t0, x0), and there exists some r > 0 such that
(i) φ ≤ −2T outside the ball B((t0, x0), r) := {(t, x) : (t− t0)
2 + (x− x0)
2 ≤ r2},
(ii) v − φ ≥ 0 = (t0, x0)− φ(t0, x0) in the ball B((t0, x0), r).
Then there exists a sequence of (tn, xn, δn) such that (tn, xn, δn)→ (t0, x0, 0) and (tn, xn) is a global
minimum of V˜ δn − φ. Due to the definition of v, we have that ξn := V˜
δn(tn, xn) − φ(tn, xn) → 0
and V˜ δn(t, x) ≤ φ(t, x) + ξn for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
According to (3.2), we obtain that
0 ≤ φ(tn, xn)+max
{
δn
(
1− µ+
µ
1 + (1/ǫ)xn/δn
)
− µφ(tn − δn, xn + δn)− (1− µ)φ(tn − δn, xn),
δn(1− µ)
(
1−
1
1 + (1/ǫ)xn/δn
)
− (1− µ)φ (tn − δn, xn − δn))− µφ(tn − δn, xx)
}
.(3.13)
We prove for the case x0 = 0, and the proof for x 6= 0 is the same. Since
{
1
1+(1/ǫ)xn/δn
}
n≥0
∈ [0, 1],
we can take a convergent subsequence. For simplicity, we still denote it by
{
1
1+(1/ǫ)xn/δn
}
n≥0
, and
assume it converges to some s ∈ [0, 1]. Letting n→∞ in (3.13), we obtain that
0 ≤ φt(t0, x0) + max {1− µ+ µs− µφx(t0, x0), (1 − µ)(1− s) + (1− µ)φx(t0, x0)} .
Note that if
1− µ+ µs− µφx(t0, x0) ≥ (1− µ)(1− s) + (1− µ)φx(t0, x0),
then we have
H2(x0, φx(t0, x0)) ≥ 1− µφx(t0, x0) ≥ 1− µ+ µs− µφx(t0, x0),
and hence
φt(t0, x0) +H2(x0, φx(t0, x0) ≥ 0.
Similarly if
(1− µ)(1 − s) + (1− µ)φx(t0, x0) ≥ 1− µ+ µs− µφx(t0, x0),
8then
H1(x0, φx(t0, x0)) ≥ 1− µ+ (1− µ)φx(t0, x0) ≥ (1− µ)(1 − s) + (1 − µ)φx(t0, x0),
and hence
φt(t0, x0) +H1(x0, φx(t0, x0) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we have shown that
max{φt(t0, x0) +H1(x0, φx(t0, x0)), φt(t0, x0) +H2(x0, φx(t0, x0))} ≥ 0.

4. Lower Bound on the Value function
It was proved in [14] that the asymptotic average value is (1 − µ) for any offline strategy of the
malicious expert if starting with weight p11 = 1/2. Here we provide a lower bound on the value
functions for the corresponding online problem
lim inf
N→∞
V (N, ρ)
N
≥ 1− µ+ µ(1− µ)(ρ− g(ρ)) > 1− µ,(4.1)
which shows that the malicious expert has more advantages when he adopts online policies.
This lower bound can be achieved if the malicious expert chooses to lie at state ρ and chooses
to tell the truth at state g(ρ). For p11 = ρ, define the corresponding strategies by
(4.2) αρt (Gt) =
{
L if p1t = ρ,
T if p1t = g(ρ),
and αρ := (αρ1, α
ρ
2, . . . ). We denote the value function associated with α
ρ by
V α
ρ
(N, ρ) = Eα
ρ
[
N∑
t=1
l(yˆt, yt)
∣∣ p11 = ρ
]
.
Proposition 4.1.
lim
N→∞
V α
ρ
(N, ρ)
N
= 1− µ+ µ(1− µ)(ρ− g(ρ)).
Proof. Under strategy αρ, {p1t }t∈N is a Markov chain with two states {ρ, g(ρ)} starting with p
1
0 = ρ,
and its transition probability is given by
P
[
p1t+1 = ρ | p
1
t = ρ
]
= 1− µ, P
[
p1t+1 = g(ρ) | p
1
t = ρ
]
= µ,
P
[
p1t+1 = ρ | p
1
t = g(ρ)
]
= 1− µ, P
[
p1t+1 = g(ρ) | p
1
t = g(ρ)
]
= µ.
Denote its distribution at time t by
πt :=
(
P(p1t = ρ),P(p
1
t = g(ρ))
)
.
It can be easily seen that (1 − µ, µ) is the stationary distribution of {p1t }t∈N. According to [11,
Theorem 4.9], the distribution πt converges to (1− µ, µ) as t→∞. Due to the equality
E
αρ
[
N∑
t=0
l(yˆt, yt)
∣∣ p10 = ρ
]
=
N∑
t=0
P(p1t = ρ)(1− µ+ µρ) +
N∑
t=0
P(p1t = g(ρ))(1 − µ)(1− g(ρ)),
it can be easily verified that
lim
N→∞
V α
ρ
(N, ρ)
N
= (1− µ)(1− µ+ µρ) + µ(1− µ)(1− g(ρ))
= 1− µ+ µ(1− µ)(ρ− g(ρ)) ≥ 1− µ.

95. asymptotically optimal strategy for the forecaster
In this section, we show that an adaptive multiplicative weightsed algorithm can resist corruptions
of the malicious expert. Different from the multiplicative weights algorithm in Section 2, the
adaptive multiplicative weightsed algorithm updates the weights pit, i = 1, 2, as follows:
pit+1 =
pite
−ηt|xit−yt|
p1t e
−ηt|x1t−yt| + p2t e
−ηt|x2t−yt|
,
where ηt =
√
8(ln 2)/t, t ∈ N+ is time-varying. Denote by V
∗(N, ρ) the value function for the
malicious expert under the adaptive multiplicative weightsed algorithm. Define
gt(p
1
t ) =
1
1 + (1/p1t − 1)e
ηt
, g
(−1)
t (p
1
t ) =
1
1 + (1/p1t − 1)e
−ηt
.
It can be easily verified that V ∗(N, ρ) is the solution to dynamic programming equations
V ∗(t+ 1, ρ) =max{(1− µ+ µρ) + µV ∗(t, gt(ρ)) + (1− µ)V
∗(t, ρ),
(1− µ)(1− ρ) + (1− µ)V ∗
(
t, g
(−1)
t (ρ)
)
+ µV ∗(t, ρ)},
together with initial conditions V ∗(0, ρ) = 0.
Proposition 5.1.
lim
N→∞
V ∗(N, 1/2)
N
= 1− µ,(5.1)
which implies that this adaptive multiplicative weights algorithm is asymptotically optimal for the
forecaster.
Proof. Suppose the malicious expert keeps lying, i.e. taking strategies αt(Gt) = L, t ∈ N+. Then
according to (2.3), it can be easily seen that the cumulative loss under this strategy is greater than
or equal to (1− µ)N , and hence
lim inf
N→∞
V ∗(N, 1/2)
N
≥ 1− µ.
To prove the other inequality, for any path GN+1 with p
1
1 = p
2
1 = 1/2, we define
LˆN :=
N∑
t=1
l(yˆt, yt), L
i
N :=
N∑
t=1
l(xit, yt), i = 1, 2.
Applying [6, Chapter 2, Theorem 2.3], we obtain that
LˆN − min
i=1,2
LiN ≤ 2
√
N
2
ln 2 +
√
ln 2
8
,
and hence
LˆN ≤ L
2
N + 2
√
N
2
ln 2 +
√
ln 2
8
.
Therefore for any strategy α, we obtain
E
α
[
LˆN
∣∣p11 = 1/2] ≤ Eα [L2N ∣∣p11 = 1/2]+ 2
√
N
2
ln 2 +
√
ln 2
8
= (1− µ)N + 2
√
N
2
ln 2 +
√
ln 2
8
,
10
and also
lim sup
N→∞
V ∗(N, 1/2)
N
≤ 1− µ.

6. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied an online prediction problem with two experts of whom one is malicious.
At each round, based on all the prior history, the malicious expert chooses to tell the true outcome
or not so as to maximize the loss. We showed that the multiplicative weights algorithm cannot resist
the corruption of the malicious expert by explicitly finding upper and lower bounds on the value
function; see (3.12) and (4.1). We also proved that an adaptive multiplicative weights algorithm
can resist the corruption; see Proposition 5.1.
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